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I. INTRODUCTION
You wake up to a beautiful day; the sun is shining, the birds are singing, and a
nice man hands you a paper informing you that you are being sued—cue the
ominous music and thunderclouds. You spare no expense and hire the best lawyers
for the money. Thousands of dollars are invested in discovery and preparation for
trial. It appears you have a fairly solid case—the plaintiff’s arguments seem weak—
yet, the opposing party seems disinterested in settling. You want to avoid the bad
press of a trial, but you have no choice except to continue preparation. Luckily,
everything is in place for a good defense.
To your surprise, however, the day before the trial, the plaintiff gives notice of
voluntary dismissal. 1 The case is dismissed, the plaintiff has a year to re-file—as
long as he or she has no problems with the statute of limitations—and you have a
stack of attorney bills. 2 Understandably, you are upset. You want answers. Why
did the plaintiff drop the case at the last second? Answer: It does not matter, because
in Ohio, plaintiffs have an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss anytime before the
start of the trial. 3 A plaintiff is only required to file notice before the trial starts. 4
The defendant is a victim of this rule. The defendant may lose much of his or her
preparation for trial and be left without a remedy. Why would Ohio perpetuate a
defective system that tolerates such a mismanagement of judicial resources and legal
services? Not only is the defendant dispossessed of time and money, but the courts,
and by extension, the taxpayers, are also deprived of time and money. Ohio courts
are stretched to begin with; why allow another tax on them? The judge’s time is
precious, and many court dockets are at full capacity. For Ohio to consent to judges

1

A number of terms have been used throughout history to describe voluntary dismissal.
Many terms have subtle differences, and some have archaic definitions and distinctions. For
example, some quotes may refer to “nonsuits” or “discontinuances.” For this discussion, the
term “voluntary dismissal” is sufficient to encompass these ideas. As the history of voluntary
dismissals progressed, the various meanings behind the different terms began to merge. It is
beyond the scope of this Note to address all the differences in the definitions and usage. Some
commentators have discussed the true meaning of many of these terms. See Neil C. Head, The
History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20, 20-21 (1921).
2
Think that is harsh? See Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105
(2d Cir. 1953). The plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal in an action for specific
performance after several days of testimony created a record of four-hundred-and-twenty
pages. Id. at 107-08. This is one of the few instances where the court bent the rules and
barred the plaintiffs from voluntarily dismissing. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
3

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a) (stating that a plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss all claims
without an order of the court by “filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the
commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court has been served by that defendant”).
4

Id.
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sitting idle because a case was voluntarily dismissed immediately before the trial is
poor stewardship. This was not the purpose of the rule.
Modern litigation has evolved radically from the common law era, and these
changes need to be taken into account. A considerable workload is completed prior
to the commencement of proceedings. This increases the costs for both parties.
Voluntary dismissal following such an endeavor of preparation creates an
exceedingly harsh consequence. Ohio should adopt a modification of the Federal
Rule concerning voluntary dismissal that limits the possibility of abuse while still
allowing plaintiffs to dismiss by the discretion of the court.
This Note will demonstrate that a modified Federal Rule is the best rule for
voluntary dismissal. First, this Note will survey the history of voluntary dismissal
and the progression from the common law in England to the current Federal Rule.
Second, this Note will discuss the abuses of the rule in Ohio and the need for change.
Third, this Note will dissect the Ohio Rule and compare it alongside the Federal
Rule. Fourth, this Note will examine possible alternatives. Finally, this Note will
propose why a modification of the Federal Rule is the most practical answer to the
abuses of voluntary dismissal.
II. THE HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
A. Early Common Law Forerunners
Voluntary dismissal is an ancient civil procedure concept that was born out of
early English common law. As early as 1371, the plaintiff had the right to voluntary
dismissal. 5 Under the early common law, voluntary dismissal was absolutely
unrestricted. 6 Later restrictions limited dismissal to any time prior to the jury
rendering its verdict. 7 Although the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs, he or she was
not precluded from filing the action again. 8 Under this rule, the plaintiff had
ultimate discretion to dismiss his or her case up to the return of the verdict. 9
Moreover, at common law, the plaintiff could—and often did—voluntarily dismiss a
cause of action by merely failing to appear for the verdict.10
Under common law, this absolute right was not unreasonable, and the plaintiff
carried a heavier burden than current plaintiffs. First, he or she did not have the

5

Head, supra note 1, at 21-22.

6

Id. at 22.

7
Id. Also, in early cases, the plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss even after the verdict had
been rendered if the plaintiff did not agree with the damages amount. Id. at 23; see also Paul
M. Lipkin, Note, The Right of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss his Action
Without Prejudice, 37 VA. L. REV. 969, 970 (1951). This was an even bigger advantage for the
plaintiff and a bigger injustice to the defendant. Head, supra note 1, at 24. This was also the
reason for the first statutory restriction on the absolute right of voluntary dismissal. Head,
supra note 1, at 24-25; see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
8

Head, supra note 1, at 22.

9

Id. The plaintiff could not be dismissed unless he or she agreed to the dismissal. Id.

10

See id. at 21-22. It appears this was common practice by 1371 because it occurred
without any comment. Id.
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liberal pleading rules that presently exist. 11 Furthermore, causes of action had to be
pursued under ancient writs. Thus, if the plaintiff sued under an incorrect writ, he or
she was unable to remedy the mistake. The plaintiff would then lose his or her case
under the incorrect writ. Times have changed, however, and “[t]he plaintiff’s
common law right to voluntary dismissal is no longer necessitated by hypertechnical
rules of procedure which once prevailed in England.” 12
The plaintiff was also limited by the common law concept of “amercement.”
“Amercement” literally meant that the losing party was at the “mercy of the court.” 13
By voluntarily dismissing, the plaintiff basically conceded defeat and was subject to
whatever the court decided. The court could even impose a fee—a penalty the
plaintiff would not take lightly. 14 Courts, however, abandoned the doctrine of
amercement during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leaving the plaintiff
with the unchecked absolute right to dismiss. 15 “The common-law [voluntary
dismissal] is the result of a legal rule retained in our law after its purpose has been
lost sight of and any possible reason for its existence has disappeared.” 16
The United States adopted the same common law concept of an absolute right of
voluntary dismissal until the verdict, but without the amercement concept. 17 Abuse
by plaintiffs and the “injustices done to the defendant,” however, gave rise to
statutory modification of voluntary dismissal. 18 The common law rule was well
established, which made it unlikely that a court would ever limit voluntary dismissal.
Therefore, legislation was necessary in order to make reforms to the absolute right of
voluntary dismissal. 19
Statutory modification of voluntary dismissal is not a new concept. In England,
as early as 1400, statutes prohibited the plaintiff from dismissing after the verdict

11

See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

12

Lawrence Mentz, Note, Voluntary Dismissal by Order of Court—Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) and Judicial Discretion, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 446, 459 (19721973). This argument, however, fails to entertain the possibility that the absolute right to
voluntary dismissal may address another issue in modern law.
13

Head, supra note 1, at 24 n.26.

14

Id.

15

Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons
From History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1264 (1987). Head also mentions the downfall of
amercement. Head, supra note 1, at 24.
16

Head, supra note 1, at 24.

17

Id. at 25.

18

James L. Tucker, The Voluntary Nonsuit in Virginia, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 359
(1966). The specific abuse that led to the change were plaintiffs voluntarily dismissing after
the verdict in order to have a new trial to get a more advantageous damages verdict. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text. Voluntarily dismissing after the verdict, however, was not the
only abuse of voluntary dismissal. Specifically, the common law did not restrict the number
of voluntary dismissals that the plaintiff could have. Head, supra note 1, at 22 (citation
omitted); see infra note 58.
19

Head, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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had been given. 20 Likewise, statutory modification became the technique that
individual states in the United States utilized to continue limiting voluntary
dismissal. 21 Many problems existed, however, with these early state standards. 22
Some standards did not provide a precise moment for when the plaintiff lost his or
her absolute right to voluntary dismissal. 23 Furthermore, the newer standards set by
the states were still subject to abuse. Since the adoption of the common law, the
trend in the United States has been to shorten the time that a plaintiff has to
voluntarily dismiss without judicial interference.24
B. Voluntary Dismissal in Federal Courts
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, voluntary dismissal in federal court
was controlled by the Conformity Act. 25 The Act required the federal courts to
follow the rules of civil procedure of the state where the trial court sat, including the
rules on voluntary dismissal. 26 Many states codified their own rules, and the federal
courts had to deal with a variety of rules on voluntary dismissals. On one hand,
many states significantly restricted voluntary dismissal; however, many others kept it
as broad as the common law. 27 To remedy the disparity among the states, the federal
government eventually decided to create uniform rules for federal courts, including a
rule addressing voluntary dismissal.

20

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 970.

21

Id. at 970-71; see also Head, supra note 1, at 25-26 (noting that the common law
became too strong to limit when a plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss, which in turn required
the states to turn to the legislatures).
22
See, e.g., Raymond v. Costallas, 70 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1950) (upholding a voluntary
dismissal made after the jury returned but before the clerk asked the jury if they had come to a
verdict). This begs the question, did someone give away what the verdict was going to be?
23

See id.

24

Joseph Flum, Note, Voluntary Nonsuit From Birth to Present, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 136, 137
(1949-1950).
25
28 U.S.C. § 724 (1934), repealed by Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat.
1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
26

Id. (“The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other
than equity and admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in
the courts of record of the State within which such district courts are held, any rule of court to
the contrary notwithstanding.”).
27
The trend of restricting the right of a plaintiff to voluntary dismissal has whittled down
the number of states that retain a common law rule on voluntary dismissal. Compare Lipkin,
supra note 7, at 986 (concluding that three-fourths of the states retaining voluntary dismissal
rules allow dismissal well through the commencement of the trial), with Michael E. Solimine
& Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, 376-77
(2003) (concluding that all but thirteen states follow a close approximation of the Federal
Rule).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

5

926

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:921

The United States Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, 28 which
permits the Supreme Court to create “general rules of practice and procedure and
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts.” 29 Four years later,
the Supreme Court—with the help of the Advisory Committee—created the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created not
only as a codification of rules of procedure but also as an instrument of reform. For
example, the Federal Rules created much more liberal pleading requirements. 30 The
Federal Rules also revolutionized the rule on voluntary dismissal.
The Federal Rules limit a plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal of a cause of
action to a further extent than any of the states. The Federal Rule allows the plaintiff
to dismiss by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an
answer or a motion for summary judgment.” 31 An answer and a motion for summary
judgment are actions that are normally taken directly after the plaintiff has filed his
or her complaint. Why such a drastic change? The Advisory Committee’s notes
mention an Illinois statute that allowed voluntary dismissal only up to the start of the
trial. 32 The Advisory Committee also references the English Rules that, at the time,
allowed voluntary dismissal only before a party received an answer or before any
proceeding. 33 The adopted Federal Rule appears to closely follow the English rule. 34
Regardless of what influenced the Advisory Committee’s decision, it is obvious that
the Committee intended to limit the plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal in order to
curb abuses. 35
The states, likewise, started to restrict voluntary dismissal even more. While in
1951, only five states had adopted the Federal Rule concerning voluntary
dismissals, 36 today only thirteen states have not adopted the Federal Rule—Ohio is

28

Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
29

Id.

30

See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

31

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

32

FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (citing ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 110, §
176) (“The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to the
defendant or his attorney, and on the payment of costs, dismiss his action or any part thereof
as to such defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause. Thereafter he may dismiss
on the same terms, only [by stipulation or order of the court].”). Like Ohio’s current rule,
Illinois limited voluntary dismissal after the trial commences. Id.; OHIO R. CIV. P. 41.
Although the Illinois Rule was one of the most restrictive in 1937, Illinois is one of the
thirteen states that have yet to retain the federal standard or a similar standard. See supra note
27 and accompanying text.
33

FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (citing English Rules Under the Judicature
Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 26).
34

Head, supra note 1, at 27; see infra note 39 and accompanying text.

35

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 374.

36

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 985.
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one of the thirteen. 37 All the other states—and the District of Columbia 38 —have
adopted the Federal Rule provision on voluntary dismissal exactly or with only
minor alterations. 39 Many commentators consider this trend “desirable.” 40
III. COMPARING THE ANTIQUATED OHIO RULE TO THE MODERN FEDERAL RULE
A. Early Voluntary Dismissal in Ohio
Ohio inherited the common law rule on voluntary dismissal. 41 Like other states,
Ohio also decided to limit the absolute right to dismiss. 42 Setting boundaries to
voluntarily dismissal is problematic. Deciding when plaintiffs are permitted to
voluntarily dismiss during civil litigation creates problems concerning prior adverse
decisions. For example, if the court denies admission of the plaintiff’s evidence, he
or she could just dismiss and avoid the negative impact of that decision.
Furthermore, determining what role the court should play in voluntary dismissal also
presents hurdles. If the court is given a limited role, the risk of abuse is elevated. If
the court is given too much discretion, however, the risk that the plaintiff may be
unfairly prejudiced is elevated.
The principal issue is where to draw the line with respect to the plaintiff’s
unfettered right to voluntarily dismiss a cause of action. Furthermore, this limit may
be set at many different places during the course of litigation. 43 For example, the
time may be limited to after the complaint is filed, when the motion for summary
judgment is filed, when preliminary hearings occur, or when the trial starts.
37
Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 376-77. Although the author’s count yields
eighteen states, it varies depending upon what one considers a modification of the Federal
rule. See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
38

The District of Columbia’s adoption of the Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal
does not carry much weight. The District of Columbia is governed by the federal government,
and it would be unlikely that it would adopt a different standard than the federal courts. The
United States Constitution provides that the United States has the right “[t]o exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
39
Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 376-77. Many commentators have embraced the
Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal and urge the states to follow in suit. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (citing English Rules Under the Judicature Act
(The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 26); Head, supra note 1, at 27 (arguing for the “English rule”
that is very similar to the federal rule); Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 404-05; Steven
C. Ward, Gibellina v. Handley: Toward a Federal Approach to Voluntary Dismissal, 79 ILL.
B.J. 336, 358 (1991).
40

Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a): The Disappearing Right of
Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738, 742 (1954) [hereinafter Absolute Dismissal].
41

Heirs of David French v. French, 8 Ohio 214 (1837). Other cases made the point that
the right to dismiss was normal practice. See Harbeson v. Gano, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 396
(1853). The entire opinion in Harbeson is one sentence.
42

OHIO REV. STAT. § 5314 (Swan 1854).

43

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 970 (“There are, obviously, innumerable places in the
proceedings of a trial which the legislature could conveniently choose.”).
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In 1853, the Ohio General Assembly, in its first session under the new
constitution of 1851, tackled the task of creating a civil code. 44 The wording it chose
in the 1853 statute remained the rule of voluntary dismissal until the adoption of the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970. 45 Under the 1853 statute, an action could be
dismissed without prejudice “[b]y the plaintiff, before its final submission to the
jury, or to the court, when the trial is by the court.” 46 This statute gave the plaintiff
an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss any time before the issue was submitted to
the trier-of-fact for determination.
B. The Recent Ohio Rules
Ohio is not lagging behind in the adoption of the other Federal Rules’ provisions.
In 1970, Ohio used the Federal Rules as a model for the newly created Ohio Rules
and altered the Federal Rules when necessary. 47 Ohio not only refused to adopt the
Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal, it also chose not to integrate Ohio’s
previous rule on voluntary dismissal into the new Ohio Rules. 48 Instead, when the
Ohio Rules were drafted in 1970, the General Assembly repealed the previous
statute 49 and adopted another standard completely.
The Ohio Rule states that a plaintiff may dismiss by “filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before the commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has been served by that
defendant.” 50 The statute is unambiguous and has no need for construction by the
courts. 51 A question remains as to why Ohio changed its approach to voluntary
dismissal.
C. The Rationale of the Current Ohio Rule
The staff notes to the Ohio Rules do not provide any rationale for why the
Supreme Court of Ohio changed the law. 52 An Ohio judge intimate with the making
of the rule indicated an Ohio tradition “of encouraging voluntary terminations.” 53
44

OHIO REV. STAT. § 5314 (Swan 1854).

45

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.05(A) (Baldwin 1964), repealed by H.R. 1201, 108th
Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1970).
46

Id.

47

JOHN V. CORRIGAN, OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO AND THE GOVERNOR OF OHIO: REPORT OF THE RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 26-27 (1969).
48

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.05(A).

49

H.R. 1201, 108th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1970) (repealing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2323.05(A) (Baldwin 1964)).
50

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a).

51

Standard Oil Co. v. Grice, 345 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).

52

Id. at 460.

53

Id. Solimine also elaborated that the rule was adopted in light of Ohio’s “tradition of
encouraging voluntary dismissal.” Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 377. The author
elaborates by citing specific cases such as a case that allowed voluntary dismissal after an
adverse decision but before it was journalized by the clerk. Id. at 377-78.
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Judge McBride—who was on the advisory committee that wrote the rules—reviewed
the records from the rules committee to clarify the reasons why the rule was
changed. 54 The first draft of the Ohio Rule concerning voluntary dismissal mirrored
the Federal Rule. 55 Some on the committee, however, objected. 56 Specifically,
some committee members thought that the plaintiff should have the absolute right to
voluntarily dismiss at least once. 57 The Federal Rule provides this right, but it is
limited to early stages of the trial. 58 The opponents of the Federal Rule on voluntary
dismissal were concerned about injustices to the plaintiff in certain circumstances,
such as if a judge refuses to grant a continuance on the day of the trial. 59 After
considering a number of possibilities, the committee settled on allowing plaintiffs to
voluntarily dismiss up to the “commencement” of the trial. 60
Ohio’s action demonstrates that issues did exist with the absolute right of
voluntary dismissal. By transforming the law, Ohio tacitly conceded that the reasons
behind the absolute right to dismiss have at least diminished and that voluntary
dismissal may be abused. With the limited information available, the committee
apparently did not even consider retaining the old Ohio rule. 61 By agreeing to such a
change, the committee—a group of Ohio lawyers, judges, and law professors—
indicated that the reasoning behind limiting voluntary dismissal is persuasive.
The rule for voluntary dismissal does not operate in a vacuum. Here, the
committee looked at the possible effects that a change in the rule would have on
other rules and actions. 62 The committee pointed out the differences between the

54

Standard Oil Co., 345 N.E.2d at 460-61. Judge Robert L. McBride—the one who wrote
this opinion—also served on the committee that wrote the rules. CORRIGAN, supra note 47, at
27. The cases raised the issue of involving a voluntary dismissal of a counterclaim. The
voluntary dismissal was after the court’s opinion that would have disposed of the counterclaim
on its merits but before it was journalized. Standard Oil Co., 345 N.E.2d at 460. The trial
court then struck down the voluntary dismissal and placed the adverse opinion in its place. Id.
55

Standard Oil Co., 345 N.E.2d at 460.

56
Id. McBride identifies that it was the attorneys on the committee who objected to the
Federal Rule. Id. The committee also had judges and law professors as members. CORRIGAN,
supra note 47, at 26.
57

Standard Oil Co., 345 N.E.2d at 460.

58

The Federal Rule, however, limits the number of voluntary dismissals to only one: “[I]f
the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal—or state—court action based on or including
the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(a)(1)(B); see also supra note 18.
59

Standard Oil Co., 345 N.E.2d at 460-61.

60

Id. at 461. The committee considered limiting voluntary dismissal to after empanelling
the jury or to the time the case is called. Id. Later, the committee decided that it should be at
the commencement of the trial. Id.
61

See id. at 460-61.

62

At one time, a version of the rule limited voluntary dismissals to before the trial was
“called.” Apparently this was subject to various meanings in different jurisdictions. Id. at
460. Although, the drafters made it clear that they intended the point when dismissal became
restricted to be before the voir dire. Id.
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state and federal court systems. 63 The record available is incomplete as to what other
aspects were discussed. 64 The committee did not know for sure what effects the new
civil procedure system would have in Ohio; they were adopting a radically different
civil procedure system than the one that was currently in place. The committee did
not want to go too far and prejudice the plaintiffs. Now that it is apparent how
liberal the Ohio Rules are with respect to pleadings and continuances, the old rule is
obsolete.
D. Stalled Reforms in Ohio
The Ohio Rule on voluntary dismissal has not gone unchallenged; politically
powerful groups, however, have continually stopped any change from going forward.
The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers successfully opposed a movement to limit
voluntary dismissals to five days before the scheduled trial date. 65 This draws two
important points. First, it demonstrates that a change in the rule is desired. This is
obviously not a fleeting desire but a powerful movement that a large group of people
were willing to set in motion. The committee actually recommended that the
Supreme Court of Ohio change the rule, but the Court did not adopt the suggested
changes. 66 The committee’s willingness to adopt the changes demonstrates that there
is sound reasoning for a change in the Ohio rule.
Furthermore, another conclusion that can be drawn from the opposition to
changing the current law on voluntary dismissal is that a strong group benefits from
the current law. This demonstrates that plaintiffs do use voluntary dismissals or at
least rely on them to a certain degree. 67 Logically, if voluntary dismissals were
never used, no one would work so hard to defend the current rule. Such a response
to a limited expansion shows the enormous support for the current rule. This,
however, does not necessarily mean that the groups advocating for retention of the
current rule are condoning abuse of the rule. Proponents of the current rule may be
trying to defend a tactical advantage. Furthermore, such groups are most likely
concerned with potential prejudice to plaintiffs.
E. The Language of the Ohio and Federal Rules
The Ohio Rules state that a plaintiff may dismiss by “filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before the commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has been served by that
defendant.” 68 A plaintiff only has to file “notice.” 69 This means that the court does
not determine whether to approve the dismissal. This leaves the discretion solely in
the hands of the plaintiff. Unfortunately, the definition for “commencement of the
63

Id.

64

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41 staff note (1970). Another commentator examined the evidence as to
why Ohio did not adopt the Federal Rule. Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 377-78.
65

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 384 n.79.

66

Id.

67

Id. at 383-84.

68

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a).

69

Id.
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trial” is not in the rule. 70 An Ohio court of appeals found that the trial started “when
the jury is empaneled [sic] and sworn, or, in a bench trial, at opening statements.” 71
In Ohio, once the trial starts, the plaintiff may no longer voluntarily dismiss by filing
notice. 72 In order for the plaintiff to dismiss following that period, he or she must
rely on Ohio Rule 41(A)(2). 73
Ohio Rule 41(A)(2) provides that, except for under (A)(1), “a claim shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance except upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” 74 The rule mandates that if the
plaintiff cannot dismiss under Rule 41(A)(1)(a), an order from the court is needed to
dismiss. 75 Furthermore, the court may add terms and conditions as it “deems
proper.” 76 This allows the court to put conditions on dismissal and permits the court
to refuse dismissal if those conditions are not met. Furthermore, due to the similarity
between the Federal Rule and the Ohio Rule, a few Ohio courts of appeals have
adopted the federal standard of allowing dismissal “unless the defendant will be
prejudiced.” 77
The Ohio Rule, no doubt, is a plaintiff-friendly rule. 78 It allows the plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss up to the start of trial. In many cases, however, much—if not
most—of the effort is done before the trial even starts. For example, depositions,
evidence, and a myriad of other work must be completed to be fully prepared for
trial. All this effort put to the front end of the litigation indicates that both parties
may have invested a considerable amount of time and money before the trial starts.
Additionally, Ohio’s saving statute makes Ohio law especially plaintiff-friendly. 79

70
4 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE, ANDERSON’S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE §168.02 (2d ed. 2009)
(citing Patrick Carroll, Note, The Meaning of the Term “Trial” Within the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 515 (1976)). The article that Solimine cites argues that a trial
commences “when the oath or affirmation is administered to the array of prospective jurors.”
Carroll, supra, at 532. Later an Ohio Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion. Frazee
v. Ellis Bros., 682 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
71

Frazee, 682 N.E.2d at 678.

72

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a).

73

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(2) (“Except as provided in division (A)(1) of this rule, a claim
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance except upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.”).
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Capital One Bank v. Woten, 861 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (following the
Ninth District’s description of the federal standard).
78

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 383.

79

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (West 2009). “[A] voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Civ.R. 41(A)(1) constitutes failure ‘otherwise than upon the merits’ within the meaning of the
savings statute.” Frysinger v. Leech, 512 N.E.2d 337, 342 (Ohio 1987). Commentators have
discussed the effects of the Ohio saving statute. See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 378
n.44; Constance Whyte Reinhard, Note, Pitfalls Associated with the Ohio Saving Statute, 36
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The savings statute gives the plaintiff one year to re-file. 80 In many cases, this may
act to extend the statute of limitations. 81 As such, these rules grant a considerable
advantage to plaintiffs.
The language of the Federal Rule allows voluntary dismissal, subject to other
rules and federal statutes, by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” 82 The notice
requirement is identical to the Ohio Rule, and the only substantive difference is the
moment in litigation that the plaintiff loses his right to dismiss by notice. Once the
defendant files an answer or a motion for summary judgment, 83 the plaintiff is
constrained and may only dismiss if the judge permits it. Under the Federal Rule, a
plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to go to the judge and request a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice. 84 The Ohio rule on voluntary dismissal by order of the
court follows the Federal Rule nearly exactly. 85 Federal judges acquire discretion on
voluntary dismissal once an answer or motion for summary judgment is filed. 86 In
Ohio, judges acquire discretion on voluntary dismissal after the commencement of
the trial—much later than the federal judges. 87
F. Significant Differences Between the Federal Rules and the Ohio Rules
The Federal Rules were established, passed, and promulgated in a very different
context than were the Ohio Rules. The new Federal Rules were a radical change to
OHIO ST. L.J. 876 (1975) (discussing the problems with the Ohio saving statute).
problems with the saving statute are still being litigated today.

The

80

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (“In any action that is commenced or attempted to
be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails
otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action
survives, the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one year after the
date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or
within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This
division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.” (emphasis added)).
This allows the plaintiff to extend the time that he or she has to re-file by possibly longer than
the statute of limitations.
81
See, e.g., Naragon v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D. Ohio
1996). Naragon provides some insight; however, it is a federal case and, therefore, is not
controlling.
82

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

83

The motion for summary judgment was added to the rule in 1946. FED. R. CIV. P. 41
advisory committee’s note (1946). The reasoning given was that drafting a motion for
summary judgment may require more time and research than filing an answer. Id.
Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment may be filed before the answer and may
eliminate the need for an answer. Id.
84

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).

85

Compare id. (“Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”), with OHIO
R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1).
86

See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2).

87

See id.; OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a), (A)(2).
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civil procedure. The rules reformed civil procedure by providing very liberal rules
for pretrial discovery, pleadings, and continuances. 88 Additionally, the new rules
offered the plaintiff alternatives to voluntary dismissal. 89 As such, the Supreme
Court also decided to limit a plaintiff’s opportunity to voluntarily dismiss to prior to
the time the defendant filed an answer. 90
Because Ohio adopted rules similar to the federal system, the liberal standards
would likely be applied in Ohio as well. This seems to question Ohio’s logic behind
refusing to limit the right of voluntary dismissal to the same extent as the Federal
Rules. This argument assumes that federal courts and Ohio courts are identical—
highly unlikely. Ohio—like most states—has made some tort reform that increases
the burdens on plaintiffs. One such measure is included in the Ohio Rules
themselves. Specifically, Ohio Rule 10(D)(2) requires an additional affidavit in a
medical liability claim. 91 Beyond this limited case, however, plaintiffs in Ohio have
a similar burden than those in other state courts and in the Federal courts. This rule
demonstrates that a new Ohio rule concerning voluntary dismissal must consider the
Ohio judicial system in order to achieve the best fit.
IV. PROBLEMS
Regardless of the burden placed on the plaintiff, the current Ohio Rule still
provides an opportunity for abuse. It is difficult, however, to determine the extent
that a plaintiff could manipulate the system under the current scheme. This is due, in
part, to the fact that Ohio does not differentiate the amount of cases that are
voluntarily dismissed each year in its Court Reports. Likewise, other states and the
federal courts do not seem to keep records either. 92 Some commentators, however,
88

“It should be observed that the potential hardship of the restrictive federal rule is
alleviated by the liberal amendment and continuance provisions which adequately protect the
plaintiff from surprise at trial.” William W. Sweeney, Nonsuit in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REV.
751, 754 (1966).
89
In circumstances where the plaintiff is entirely caught off guard, the plaintiff could
always request a continuance. “[I]t would seem to be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge
not to grant a continuance in such a situation.” Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 387-88.
The Federal Rules provide other avenues for plaintiffs besides voluntary dismissal. The
Federal Rules provide that each court controls scheduling. FED. R. CIV. P. 40. Also, the
Federal Rules allow extensions of time to file motion papers with good cause. FED. R. CIV. P.
6(b). Furthermore, the same standard (good cause) applies to rescheduling for pre-trial
conferences as well. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4).
90

See Naragon v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ohio 1996);
Flum, supra note 24, at 140; Sweeney, supra note 88, at 754; Absolute Dismissal, supra note
40, at 742.
91

OHIO R. CIV. P. 10(D)(2). The rule was amended in 2005 to impose this new restriction
on medical liability actions. Ohio is not alone with these types of restrictions. In Wisconsin’s
Rule on voluntary dismissal, a special restriction permits the court to dismiss false claims for
medical assistance. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 805.04(2m) (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
20.931(1)(b) (West 2009) (defining what constitutes a false claim for medical assistance).
92
See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 382 (“Unfortunately, there appears to be little
hard data that can be brought to bear on the use of Rule 41(a). Official statistics kept for the
federal court keep track of dismissals in a generic fashion, and thus do not differentiate
between or among dismissals founded on Rules 12 or 41.”); Sweeney, supra note 88, at 764
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postulate that litigants often abuse the system by exercising the unfettered right to
dismiss their cause of action. 93 On the other hand, information is not available on
how many of those cases were dismissed due to legitimate issues or concerns. As
mentioned above, many commentators 94 and an Ohio judge have protested the
inequities of the Ohio Rule on voluntary dismissal. 95
A. Injury to the Court
The plaintiff is given a considerable amount of power, and if he or she abuses it,
he or she can “subject the state and defendant to expense and loss of time.” 96 Ohio
certainly has “a valuable right” in litigation and, by extension, an interest affected by
voluntary dismissal. 97 Voluntary dismissal results in courts becoming congested
with “unnecessary litigation.” 98 Abusing voluntary dismissal depletes the resources
of the court. 99 Furthermore, Ohio’s Rule on voluntary dismissal is contrary to the
doctrine of res judicata. “The public policy inherent in the doctrine of res judicata
demands that needless litigation be avoided and that there be an end to legal
controversy.” 100 On the larger stage, “[t]he ends of justice are defeated when the
plaintiff is permitted to harass the defendant and to waste the time of the court and
(“Statistics on nonsuits are not easily obtained because few courts in this state keep a separate
record of them as such.”).
93
See Sweeney, supra note 88, at 751 (“Virginia lawyers, especially those representing
plaintiffs, have long utilized the voluntary nonsuit as a valuable trial tactic, often to escape a
losing battle.” (citation omitted)). Solimine and Lippert state:
[T]here is nonetheless some evidence that such dismissals are sought or obtained with
some frequency in both federal and state courts. With regard to unilateral voluntary
dismissals, attorneys report that such dismissals are not uncommon, especially in a
state like Ohio with a plaintiff-friendly rule. A recent study of civil rights actions filed
in federal court indicated that up to twelve percent of such cases were voluntarily
dismissed (as opposed to other types of terminations and dismissals).
Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 383 (citation omitted). Others disagree, such as Tucker,
supra note 18, at 357 (“[T]he voluntary nonsuit . . . is often completely ignored by the
plaintiff’s lawyer.”), but the author differentiates this by saying that this is because of the
confusion in that state’s dismissal practices. The arguments made against earlier movements
for reform in the Ohio law also provide insight as to how much it is used and whether it is
really used for a tactical advantage. See infra note 120.
94

In 1918, a commentator in the United States was complaining about the abuses caused
by the absolute right of voluntary dismissal. Carroll G. Walter, Right of Plaintiff to
Discontinue or Submit to Nonsuit, 13 BENCH & B., NEW SERIES 464, 466 (1918-1919).
95

Hosner v. Gibson Partner, Inc., 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 4 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986) (finding
the abuse of the Ohio Rule concerning voluntary dismissal permitted the court to award the
defendant attorney fees in addition to costs despite the language of the rule). Later, the
Supreme Court of Ohio found that Ohio Rule 41(D) did not permit an award of attorney fees.
Muze v. Mayfield, 573 N.E.2d 1078, 1079 (Ohio 1991); see also infra Part V.A.
96

Head, supra note 1, at 24.

97

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 987.

98

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767.

99

See Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767; Lipkin, supra note 7, at 987.

100

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 987; see also Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767.
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the money of the public.” 101 Judges and scholars have recognized that voluntary
dismissal is diametrically opposed to “the public interest in efficient administration
of justice.” 102 Finally, voluntary dismissals late in the process may leave jurors—
who sacrifice time to perform their civic duty—sitting idle. 103 The only positive
feature of voluntary dismissal is that it may clear crowded dockets; but this only
occurs if the complaints are dismissed with enough time for judges to reschedule. 104
The current Ohio Rule permits, and in some situations encourages, eleventh-hour
voluntary dismissals. The saving statute gives the plaintiff one year from the date of
the dismissal to re-file. 105 If the plaintiff is not prepared, he or she may just wait
until the last minute in order to get a longer time to re-file or try to see if the
opposing party will settle. The plaintiff does not benefit in any way by voluntarily
dismissing earlier. Once again, court resources would be left idle while the docket
continues accumulating.
B. Strategic Abuse
Voluntary dismissal may be used strategically. In a few instances, the strategic
use of voluntary dismissal is not abusive to other parties or the courts. “[I]f an
attorney is faced with a case that appears non-meritorious or not cost-effective, or if
he simply cannot get along with his client, he can dismiss the case without
prejudice.” 106 Furthermore, if the case is discovered shortly before the statute of
limitations, an attorney may file a complaint and receive additional time to assess
whether the case should be continued. 107 Voluntary dismissal that is used for other
strategic goals, however, damages other parties and judicial efficiency.
Voluntary dismissal bestows on the plaintiff an immense tactical advantage. 108
For example, a plaintiff may dismiss part of the action in one jurisdiction—say,
Ohio—and then re-file that claim in California forcing the defendant to appear in
both places adding expense and giving the plaintiff leverage to force a settlement. 109

101

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 987.

102
Jeffrey C. Regan, Note, Plaintiffs’ Absolute Right to Voluntary Dismissal: Legitimate
Right or Abuse of Judicial Process?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 118, 143 (1984).
103

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 768.

104

Daniel D. Mason, Note, Hosner v. The Gibson Partner Warning: “Free” Dismissals
Under 41(A)(1)(A) Can Really Cost, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 233, 233 (1990). The author backs
this up by saying that most cases that are voluntarily dismissed are never re-filed, but he fails
to cite any evidence for this. Id. at 234.
105

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (West 2009).

106

Mason, supra note 104, at 234.

107

Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A).

108

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767.

109
Thomas Southard, Increasing the “Costs” Nonsuit: A Proposed Clarifying Amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(D), 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 367, 367 (2002). In some
cases, much of the pretrial materials prepared by the defendant might be used in the later
litigation, but in other cases, the defendant may have to start again whenever the plaintiff refiles. This might not be a problem in all cases, but it would be unfair in cases where the pretrial discovery would have to happen all over again. Normally, the considerable amount of

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

15

936

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:921

If a judge’s discretion was put between the plaintiff and this dismissal, the judge
could demand terms and conditions that could lessen the effect of this rule. 110 In
fact, this tactic is frequently used to make litigation difficult and force a
settlement. 111 Furthermore, plaintiffs may bluff until the last minute, not prepare at
all, induce defendants to incur expenses, and then dismiss the cause of action. 112
This abuse “may not affect the substantive rights of the defendant,” but it still costs
time and money and increases the possibility of prolonged litigation.113
Furthermore, the Ohio Rule permits the plaintiff to get a preview of the
defendant’s case, including possible defenses during the discovery phase. 114 At the
same time, the plaintiff may, in advance, plan on voluntarily dismissing his or her
cause of action and reserve crucial evidence normally revealed during the discovery
phase. 115 Conversely, in these situations the defendant has no choice but to present
the best evidence for his or her case. 116 Thereafter, the plaintiff can dismiss his or
her case, prepare for the defendant’s evidence and defenses, and re-file his or her
claims.
C. No Judicial Oversight
The abuses of voluntary dismissal could be easily cured by judicial oversight.
Ohio, however, does not provide judicial oversight until the trial starts. If Ohio did
have judicial oversight, then a judge would see a tactical abuse of the rule and be
able to stop it before the plaintiff gains an advantage. The Federal Rules address the
possibility of abuse by conferring discretion to judges to determine whether to allow
voluntary dismissals after an answer or a motion for summary judgment is filed. 117
This rule affords plaintiffs the opportunity to argue their cases for dismissal before
the judge. This rule is not without flaws. For example, issues may arise concerning
the amount of discretion given to the court as well as the malleable standard for
when a voluntary dismissal is appropriate.
time and money the defendant expends before the trial will go to waste if the plaintiff re-files.
See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 388-99.
110

See OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(2).

111

Southard, supra 109, at 367.

112

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 768.

113

Tucker, supra note 18, at 366-67.

114

Id. at 367.

115

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767 (“Defense attorneys argue that nonsuit allows the
plaintiff to use the first trial as a substitute for pretrial discovery to preview the defendant’s
case. Thus although the plaintiff may ‘keep under wraps’ his best witnesses when he presents
his case because he knows that he is going to nonsuit, the defendant cannot be sure whether or
not the plaintiff will in fact nonsuit and therefore must put his best foot forward by using all
his witnesses at trial.”).
116

Tucker, supra note 18, at 366-67.

117

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the
dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not
under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party
under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.”).
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE
Ohio’s voluntary dismissal rule facilitates abuse and needs to be changed. The
reasons for the absolute right of voluntary dismissal at common law have evaporated.
Ohio’s rationales for retaining this antiquated doctrine are unfounded. The idea that
the plaintiff has a right to have complete control over his or her case is obsolete. 118
Ohio should not build rules of civil procedure on such a weak foundation.
Change, however, is a hard task to undertake. Ohio adopted the current rule only
after careful consideration and debate. 119 In addition, previous failed attempts to
amend the rule demonstrate a sharp resistance by powerful groups in Ohio. 120 Ohio
must consider these factors in deciding what new standard should be adopted for
voluntary dismissal.
Furthermore, a few important principles should be considered when evaluating a
procedural rule. First, the rules must consider the interests of the parties involved.
The rule cannot focus solely on the possible abuses by plaintiffs against defendants
and create a new rule that allows prejudice against plaintiffs. The rule must balance
the interests of all parties involved. 121 Without balancing these interests, the
limitation would become “no more than meaningless technicalities.” 122 Finally, the
solution “should be fitted to modern needs and circumstances.” 123 The recent trend
of increasing expenses of pretrial discovery is an issue that should be considered. 124
A. Solution 1: Adopt Procedural Limitations
It may not be necessary for Ohio to alter the current rule on voluntary dismissal
to address the issue of abuse. Currently, Ohio Rule 41(D) allows the court to award
the defendant reasonable costs if the plaintiff re-files in an Ohio court after a
voluntary dismissal. 125 This discourages attorneys from filing voluntary dismissals
118

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 766.

119

Standard Oil Co. v. Grice, 345 N.E.2d 458, 460-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (noting the
process the advisory committee utilized in creating the rule on voluntary dismissal).
120

4 SOLIMINE, supra note 70, at § 168.01 (noting two times that attempts to change Rule
41(A) have failed); see also Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 383 nn.75-79. Michael E.
Solimine, the writer of the preceding reference, apparently has a close connection to the
reforms suggested in Ohio. Id. at 383 n.79.
121

Sweeney, supra note 88, at 767.

122

Id. at 766.

123

Tucker, supra note 18, at 367.

124

“[A]ny change in the [Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal] should be directed
towards protecting the defendant from wasted expenditure. The preparation and filing of any
motion involves considerable expense.” Absolute Dismissal, supra note 40.
125

OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(D) (“If a plaintiff who has once dismissed a claim in any court
commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the
court may make such order for the payment of costs of the claim previously dismissed as it
may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied
with the order.”). However, there is considerable discussion about what is covered in the
definition of “costs.” See Mason, supra note 104, at 233 (discussing a number of approaches
by Ohio courts in considering what a “cost” is under Rule 41(D)).
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unless it is absolutely necessary. 126 Attorney fees, however, are not included in
costs. 127 One possibility to discourage abuse is to amend Ohio Rule 41(A) to permit
courts to award attorney fees as well as cost. 128
Another possibility to discourage abuse is to expand Ohio Rule 54(D), which
allows the prevailing party to be awarded costs. 129 Like above, costs do not include
attorney fees. According to some federal courts, “Upon being voluntarily dismissed
under Rule 41(a), a defendant may receive prevailing party status so that it can
recoup its costs under Rule 54(d).” 130 Unfortunately, this appears to be a minority
view. 131 For example, in Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a defendant in an action that was voluntarily
dismissed is not a prevailing party. 132 Ohio courts recognize that after a voluntary
dismissal the “court retains jurisdiction in limited circumstances.” 133 In Ohio,
however, plaintiffs that voluntarily dismiss are not prevailing parties and, therefore,
are not entitled to costs. 134 Not only is the law split on this issue, but also Rule
126

Rule 41(D) also helps to prevent forum shopping. Southard, supra note 109, at 368.

127

Muze v. Mayfield, 573 N.E.2d 1078, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (finding Ohio Rule 41(D) does
not permit the awarding of attorney fees); Campbell v. Gallimore, 591 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990) (rejecting the claim that Ohio Rule 41(D) allowed the award of attorney fees). A
prior Ohio case, however, found otherwise. See Hosner v. Gibson Partner, Inc., 32 Ohio Misc.
2d 4, 4-5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986).
128

See Southard, supra note 109, at 400 (advocating for a similar amendment to Federal
Rule 41(d)).
129

OHIO R. CIV. P. 54(D) (“Except when express provision therefor [sic] is made either in
a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs.”).
130

Southard, supra note 109, at 370 (citing Norris v. Turner, 637 F. Supp 117, 1124 (N.D.
Alaska 1986) (“Where Rule 41(a)(2) is successfully invoked . . . the defendant is deemed to be
the ‘prevailing party’ unless expressly provided otherwise.”)); see also Corcoran v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 121 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1941) (awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant in a
copyright infringement case where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed).
131
See Santiago v. Victim Servs. Agency, 753 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Once the
plaintiff has dismissed the action under [Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(i)], the court loses all
jurisdiction over the action.”), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384
(1990). In Cooter, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Federal Rule 11 sanctions after voluntary
dismissal, meaning that even after voluntary dismissal, the trial court had jurisdiction. Cooter,
496 U.S. at 395. By contrast, other federal courts have used different reasoning coming to the
conclusion that a defendant in an action that is voluntarily dismissed is not a prevailing party.
See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
132
Szabo Food Serv., 823 F.3d at 1076 (“A dismissal without prejudice under Rule
41(a)(1)(i) does not decide the case on the merits. The plaintiff may refile the complaint . . .
.”). The court also reasoned that under Federal Rule 41(d), “[o]nly the filing of a second suit
on the same claim allows the court to award the costs of the first case.” Id. at 1077.
133

Grossman v. Mathless & Mathless, 620 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

134

See Champion Mall Corp. v. Bilbo Freight Lines, Inc., 611 N.E.2d 969, 971 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992). Frivolous claims, however, that are ultimately voluntarily dismissed are subject
to Ohio Rule 11 sanctions. See OHIO R. CIV. P. 11.
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54(D) does not resolve the problem of ever-increasing costs to the court or judicial
system.
These approaches, however, are overreaching and unduly harsh. Not every
plaintiff that utilizes voluntary dismissal is abusing the system. This approach is
over-inclusive. Instead of discouraging abuses of voluntary dismissal, this approach
only discourages plaintiffs from ever utilizing voluntary dismissal. Voluntary
dismissal still has a role in Ohio’s judicial system. 135 Only abuse of the rule should
be discouraged.
B. Solution 2: Adopt the Federal Rule
The Federal Rules were designed to be very liberal and forgiving to parties
involved. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, cases were often dismissed due
to the operation of harsh procedural rules. The code systems were considered too
complex to understand, and this resulted in individuals being denied access to the
courts. The current rules were meant to mitigate the effects of these harsh
doctrines. 136 Plaintiffs are not foreclosed merely because they filed the wrong writ.
With these liberal standards in the Federal Rules, the need for an absolute right to
voluntary dismissal no longer exists. 137 The plaintiff, however, must still be given
control of his or her case.
1. The Consequences of Limiting Dismissal to Early Stages of Litigation
Limiting dismissal to the early stages of trial insures that few resources have been
expended. “The rule is designed to permit a disengagement of the parties at the
behest of the plaintiff only in the early stages of a suit, before the defendant has
expended time and effort in the preparation of his case.” 138 With the ever-increasing
costs and effort expended earlier in cases, this is never more true than now. The
Advisory Committee weighed the costs and effort put forth when it amended the rule
in 1946 to include the reference to a motion of summary judgment. 139 The
preparation and research for trial is at least that of summary judgment. Also, the fact
that the committee looked at effort and costs in expanding the rule suggests that this
should also be a factor in deciding what rule Ohio should adopt.

135

Some commentators disagree.
accompanying text.

See infra Part V.D; see infra note 168 and

136

Federal Rule 8 is a classic example of reform to make the requirements for pleading
much lighter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
137

See supra note 90.

138

Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1971). This case concerned a
franchise of Frostie Root Beer and whether it had been wrongfully cancelled. Id. at 916-17.
Armstrong tried to give notice of voluntary dismissal after Frostie had given an answer. Id. at
916. Of course, it was not upheld and was dismissed in the trial court. Id. Apparently,
Armstrong also failed to argue before the trial court that his notice of dismissal should have
been treated as a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule 41(a)(2). Id.
139

FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (1946).
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2. Time is Up: Now What?
The federal courts have decided that if the plaintiff asks for voluntary dismissal
after the time period has passed, the court should grant it unless another party is
injured. 140 The standard used is the “legal prejudice” standard. 141 Federal courts use
a strict legal prejudice standard when examining voluntary dismissal: 142
In determining whether a defendant will suffer plain legal prejudice, a
court should consider such factors as the defendant’s effort and expense of
preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of
the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need
to take a dismissal, and whether a motion for summary judgment has been
filed by the defendant. 143
The mere “tactical advantages” provided for by voluntary dismissal do not constitute
legal prejudice. 144 The costs to the judicial system are also not a factor. Only if the
defendant is legally prejudiced will it be denied, regardless of whether he or she is
“practical[ly] prejudice[d].” 145 The standard is high, and an appellate court will
normally defer to the trial court’s decision. 146 The federal courts consider the costs
incurred by the defendant, but courts will usually side with the plaintiff when a
motion for voluntary dismissal is requested before the trial has started. 147
Furthermore, circuits do not weigh these factors the same way, and many circuits
consider additional factors. 148 The federal rule also provides no guidance on factors
the trial court should consider when determining when it is appropriate to permit a
voluntary dismissal. 149

140

Regan, supra note 102, at 136.

141

Id.

142

Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994); Regan, supra note 102, at

136.
143

Grover, 33 F.3d at 718.

144

Regan, supra note 102, at 142.

145

Id. at 138; see also Southard, supra note 109, at 371.

146

See Kovalic v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The dismissal of a
plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is within the sound discretion of
the district court and may be reversed only if the appellant can establish that the court abused
that discretion.”).
147

See Southard, supra note 109, at 371 (“When no prejudice exists, a motion for
voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) usually will be granted . . . .”); David J. Comeaux,
Comment, Avoiding Nonjudicious Nonsuits: Hearing the Defendant on Rule 41(A)(2) Motions,
32 HOUS. L. REV. 159, 160 (1995) (“Today, courts still show deference to the common-law
rule: while a court may consider the equities of both parties, the scales are tipped in the
plaintiff’s favor before a court begins its analysis.”).
148

Comeaux, supra note 147, at 177. These factors, however, can facilitate prediction of
what a court might do. Id. at 177-78.
149

See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
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The Federal Rule, however, does give courts an opportunity to make the
defendant whole. Even if there is no legal prejudice, a judge may mandate the
payment of the defendant’s costs and attorney fees as a condition to voluntary
dismissal. 150 “[B]efore trial[, voluntary] dismissal should be allowed unless
reasonable terms and conditions cannot make the defendant substantually [sic] whole
. . . .” 151 A court will normally utilize the same factors in determining what
conditions should be placed on the voluntary dismissal as those that are initially
considered in determining whether to grant the dismissal. 152
The Federal Rule addresses many of the issues present under the Ohio Rule;
however, it presents a few problems as well. The Federal Rule balances the interest
of both parties, but it fails to balance the interest of the judiciary. Plaintiffs would
still be allowed to dismiss regardless of the damage done to the judiciary. The
Federal Rule does cut down on tactical advantages to the plaintiff through voluntary
dismissal by shortening the time the plaintiff has to dismiss without a court order.
The Federal Rule fails, however, to provide a consistent balancing test for trial courts
to use to determine the equities of the parties and when voluntary dismissal should
be denied.
C. Solution 3: Adopt a Tested Rule Used by Other States
Like Ohio and the federal government, many other states have also reformed the
law on voluntary dismissal. Ohio has forty-nine examples to examine the best way
to discourage abuse of voluntary dismissal. 153 Many states have adopted the
restrictive Federal Rule, while others have standards ranging in similarity from
Ohio’s law to the lenient common law. 154 The wide variety presents many
possibilities and provides examples of the issues that arise from them.
150
Apparently “terms and conditions” is a quite common phrase that judges include when
granting voluntary dismissal. Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 380.
151

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 986.

152

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 380-81.

153

Few states allow voluntary dismissal in certain circumstances much later than Ohio, but
Ohio has clearly rejected these options by restricting voluntary dismissal. See ARK. R. CIV. P.
41(a)(1) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before submission to jury or to the court); FLA. R.
CIV. P. 1.420(a)(1) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before motion for summary judgment or if
it is denied or not made before the jury retires or it is submitted to the court); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-601 (2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before final submission to jury or court);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 683(1) (West 2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before
submission to jury or to the court); TENN. R. CIV. P. 41.01(1) (limiting voluntary dismissal to
before the trial); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (West 2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to
before motion to strike the evidence sustained or jury retires).
154
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581(b)(1) (West 2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before
actual commencement of trial); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-80 (West 2009) (limiting
voluntary dismissal to before the second day of court); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-41(a)(1)(A)
(West 2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before first witness is sworn); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-1009(a) (West 2009) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before trial begins); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1671 (2008) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before the defendant
makes an appearance of record); N.C. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(i) (limiting voluntary dismissal to
before plaintiff rests his case); PA. R. CIV. P. 229(a) (limiting voluntary dismissal to before the
start of the trial); TEX. R. CIV. P. 162 (limiting voluntary dismissal to before the plaintiff has
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1. States that Modify the Federal Rule
In New York, a plaintiff may dismiss a cause of action without an order from the
court by giving notice at any time before either a responsive pleading is served or
within twenty days after service of the pleading asserting the claim, whichever is
earlier. 155 This approach basically eliminates the plaintiff’s absolute right to
voluntarily dismiss. 156 Under this rule, a plaintiff may only voluntarily dismiss
without a court order until a responsive pleading has been filed or within twenty
days. Under the Federal Rule, when a defendant is slow to file an answer or a
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is given more time for voluntary
dismissal. Unlike the Federal Rule, plaintiffs under the New York Rule are not
rewarded by an inattentive or indifferent defendant.
Another key difference from the Federal Rule is New York’s approach to
discretion after the time for the absolute right of voluntary dismissal has passed.
New York courts seem to have a presumption in favor of allowing voluntary
dismissal. “[U]nless the defendant’s substantial rights are prejudiced or some other
injustice will result,” New York courts will allow the voluntary dismissal. 157 This
approach could effectively protect the plaintiff’s right to dismiss while still
protecting the defendant’s rights and protecting him or her from abuse of this power.
Under the New York regime, a plaintiff may still use the rule for strategic
reasons, but New York narrows the acceptable strategic reasons. 158 Plaintiffs could,
however, still file and voluntarily dismiss within the twenty-day window, but the
expense the defendants could incur over such a short time would be limited. New
York’s Rule is a step in the right direction in limiting abuse of the voluntary
dismissal while still providing the plaintiff with the option of voluntary dismissal.
In Wisconsin, a plaintiff may dismiss “any time before service by an adverse
party of responsive pleading or motion.” 159 Similar to the federal rule, after the time
allowed for the absolute right to voluntary dismissal has passed, the discretion to
permit voluntary dismissal lies with the court. 160 The Wisconsin Rule differs with
regard to the balancing test utilized in the determination of whether a voluntary
introduced all his evidence); WASH. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B) (limiting voluntary dismissal to
before plaintiff rests his case).
155

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217(a)(1) (McKinney 2009). A party can discontinue without order
from the court:
[B]y filing with the clerk of the court before the case has been submitted to the court
or jury a stipulation in writing signed by the attorneys of record for all parties,
provided that no party is an infant, incompetent person for whom a committee has
been appointed or conservatee and no person not a party has an interest in the subject
matter of the action.
Id. at 32.
156

Regan, supra note 102, at 141.

157

Id.

158

See id.

159

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 805.04(1) (West 2009).

160

Id. § 805.04(2) (“[A]n action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon
order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this subsection is not on the merits.”).
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dismissal should be permitted. 161 Wisconsin has not adopted the narrow legal
prejudice standard of the federal courts. 162 Instead, Wisconsin courts weigh not only
the interests of the parties but also the policy concerns for the “efficient use of
judicial resources.” 163 Wisconsin’s doctrine was created through a long and arduous
process of judicial interpretation that, at times, left considerable uncertainty as to the
precedential value of past decisions. 164 Despite the few uncertainties in the
Wisconsin balancing test, it provides further protection for the defendant with
insignificant costs to the plaintiff.
The approach taken by New York and Wisconsin demonstrates that the Federal
Rule may be adopted and altered to lessen any unnecessary hardship that the Federal
Rule creates. Although these examples are not perfect and do not solve all the
problems, they do provide insight. The rules these states have created have been
tested and may be more likely to function better in the setting of a state court. The
success of these states in eliminating such hardships provides a strong argument for
adopting the Federal Rule or a modification of the Federal Rule.
2. States that Retain Limited Variations of the Common Law Rule of Voluntary
Dismissal
Additionally, two other states have addressed the specific abuses that Ohio courts
and defendants face under the current rule. Specifically, both Oregon and Iowa
provide the absolute right to voluntarily dismiss up to a few days before trial. 165 This

161

Regan, supra note 102, at 144. Wisconsin courts also use many factors that the federal
courts consider when determining whether a voluntary dismissal should be granted:
Factors to consider when reviewing a motion for voluntary dismissal include: “[1] the
plaintiff’s diligence in bringing the motion; [2] any ‘undue vexatiousness’ on the
plaintiff’s part; [3] the extent to which the suit has progressed, including the
defendant’s efforts and expense in preparation for trial; [4] the duplicative expense of
relitigation; and [5] the adequacy of plaintiff’s explanation for the need to dismiss.”
Clark v. Mudge, 599 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (quoted source omitted in original).
162

Clark, 599 N.W.2d at 70. “A plaintiff does not have an absolute right to discontinue
his action. Leave to discontinue may be denied in the discretion of the court if the rights of
defendants, third parties, or the public will be substantially prejudiced by discontinuance.”
Russell v. Johnson, 111 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Wis. 1961). Substantial prejudice is different than
the legal prejudice the federal courts use. See supra Part V.B.2.
163
Regan, supra note 102, at 145. “Such a motion involves the exercise of judicial
discretion and power in weighing the merits for granting dismissal. Public as well as private
interests are involved . . . . The public interest includes efficient judicial administration.”
Monson v. Monson, 271 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
164
See Russell, 111 N.W.2d at 196 (applying the same standard as in Burling to a case that
was not a divorce case); Burling v. Burling, 82 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis. 1957) (finding that a
court may deny a motion for voluntary dismissal if, among other things, “the public will be
substantially prejudiced by discontinuance”); Monson, 271 N.W.2d at 141 (expanding the
public interest to include “efficient judicial administration”); supra notes 162-163 and
accompanying text. One commentator brought to light the idea that the solution presented in
Monson might apply only in matrimonial dispute cases but argued against that rationale.
Regan, supra note 102, at 145.
165
IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.943 (limiting the absolute right of voluntary dismissal to “until ten
days before the trial is scheduled to begin”); OR. R. CIV. P. 54(A)(1) (limiting the absolute
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solution deals directly with the harshness caused by allowing a plaintiff to dismiss on
the eve of a trial. This solution leaves enough time to save defendants some expense
and allows the court to reschedule other proceedings to ease the pressure on the
overflowing dockets. 166 This solution is great for the limited problem of eleventhhour dismissals.
This approach, however, is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is underinclusive in that it fails to reign in conspicuous abuse of the right to voluntarily
dismiss. In many cases, discovery and pre-trial issues are very costly and time
consuming, but these rules protect only the expense incurred in the few days before
trial. The short time limit may help the courts to a small degree, but it still leaves
defendants open to considerable harm. Also, it does not foreclose the plaintiff’s use
of voluntary dismissal for purely strategic reasons; it limits only the most extreme
eleventh-hour dismissals. This approach is also over-inclusive by reaching situations
that are not even close to the eleventh-hour dismissals. The limit set by Iowa refers
to scheduled trial date. 167 If the trial date is moved, the Iowa Rule would punish
plaintiffs to whom the law was not intended reach.
D. Solution 4: Eliminate Voluntary Dismissal Except with Court Order
Does the Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal provide enough
protection? Some argue that all voluntary dismissals should fall under the discretion
of the court. 168 Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid, Co., 169 is an example
of a court that chose to use its discretion to decide whether to allow a voluntary
dismissal even though the Federal Rule gave the plaintiff an absolute right to
dismiss. 170 In addition to a few courts finding for discretion in all voluntary
dismissals, many commentators have also argued for it. 171 A simple deletion of
Federal Rule 41(a)(1) would leave voluntary dismissal solely in the discretion of the
right of voluntary dismissal to “not less than five days prior to the day of the trial if no
counterclaim has been pleaded”). Ohio considered this option as well, but it was ultimately
defeated. See supra note 120.
166

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 383-84 (discussing a movement in Ohio to adopt
a similar rule limiting voluntary dismissals after five days prior to the scheduled
commencement of the trial); Mason, supra note 104, at 248 (suggesting a time limit of one
month before trial as the cutoff point for the plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal through
notice).
167

IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.943.

168
See Absolute Dismissal, supra note 40, at 743; Note, Federal Civil Procedure:
Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(1), 1962 DUKE L.J. 285, 289-90.
169

Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953). This
ruling is directly adverse to what the language of the rule states. It is clear that if notice has
been made before an answer or a motion for summary judgment, then there is no discretion by
the court.
170

Id. at 105.

171

Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a): The Disappearing Right of Voluntary
Nonsuit, supra note 40, at 743 (Written shortly after Harvey, the article concludes that the
confusion in the law could be easily avoided by getting rid of any absolute right to voluntary
dismissal.).
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court. 172 Many courts, however, have refused to expand the rule. In Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. International Bros. of Teamsters, 173 the Fifth Circuit criticized the
Harvey decision because of the difficulty of dealing in the subjective factors the
court considered. 174
Others have argued for a more limited revision to the Federal Rule. Proponents
of a limited revision to the Federal Rule argue that it should be amended to limit
voluntary dismissal when a plaintiff is requesting affirmative relief—like a
preliminary injunction. 175 When a plaintiff requests affirmative relief—like in
Harvey—an answer or a motion for summary judgment are normally filed much
later. In Harvey, no answer or motion for summary judgment was filed, but when
the preliminary injunction failed, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. 176 There is no
doubt that the defendant expended a considerable amount of resources in defending
the preliminary injunction, but the Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal
permits dismissal. A limited revision would be beneficial to avoid undue expense to
the defendant.
Completely abolishing the plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal without an
order from the court is injurious to plaintiffs and should not be considered. Many
plaintiffs have valid reasons for voluntary dismissals, and these reasons are so
persuasive they should be protected by any rule on voluntary dismissals. First, the
plaintiff has good reason to voluntarily dismiss when he or she is plainly not
ready. 177 This aspect is the hardest reason to accept because it leaves the rule open to
abuse. Specifically, it is nearly impossible to know the plaintiff’s true reason for
voluntary dismissal. 178 The plaintiff’s unpreparedness may arise from his or her own
negligence. Conversely, the plaintiff may have discovered new evidence that would
lead to another cause of action. The surprise caused by such a situation is justified,
and the plaintiff should be allowed time to develop his or her case.
Second, the plaintiff may want to re-file elsewhere with a longer statute of
limitations. 179 If the plaintiff made a mistake and filed too late in one jurisdiction, it
would be unfair to deprive him or her of the ability to file in the correct place. In
many instances, this situation might arise due to negligence, but quite a few
situations occur absent negligence. A great example is when a plaintiff realizes that
he or she has sued the wrong defendant and attempts to add the appropriate
172

See Federal Civil Procedure: Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(1), supra note
168, at 289-90. A similar deletion of the Ohio Rule 41(A)(1)(a) would create the same
outcome.
173

Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Int’l Bros. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1975).

174

Id. at 916.

175

Absolute Dismissal, supra note 40, at 743. The author, while also recognizing that
Harvey demonstrates a major change, points out that “it is in line with the desirable trend
away from plaintiff’s common law right of unrestricted dismissal.” Id. at 742.
176

Harvey, 203 F.2d at 107. The plaintiff desired to pursue the action in another country.

177

Comeaux, supra note 147, at 163.

178

Id. at 162.

179

Id. at 166.

Id.
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defendant after the statute of limitations occur. 180 Third, the plaintiff has a legitimate
right to voluntary dismissal in cases where he or she seeks a jury trial. 181 If a
plaintiff sues in admiralty, he or she does not have the right to a trial by jury. 182 The
plaintiff might realize later that he or she was able to sue in a regular civil court and
gain the opportunity to have a jury trial. The plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to change to a court where a jury trial would be available, especially if
the plaintiff was unaware of the jury opportunity before filing the complaint in
admiralty court.
This list is in no way comprehensive. Many other reasons have been mentioned
above, and many more reasons might develop in the future. The courts realize that
numerous reasons for voluntary dismissal are legitimate, and ignoring those reasons
would be harmful to the administration of justice. In developing a rule, these
practical reasons must constantly be used to assess the burden that a rule would have
on the interests of the plaintiffs. The federal courts also consider the plaintiff’s
reasons when deliberating whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(2). 183 Furthermore, if a judge were to deny a motion for voluntary
dismissal in cases of surprise or hardship, the judge would be abusing his or her
discretion. 184 Refusing to allow plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss in any instance will
not solve the problems of abuse. 185

180

Id. at 167-68 (discussing this exact situation).

181

Id. at 171.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 162. The federal courts consider other factors as well:
In assessing prejudice, factors to consider include (1) the excessive and duplicative
expenses of a second litigation; (2) defendant’s effort and expense in preparing for
trial; (3) whether the plaintiff delayed or was dilatory in prosecuting the action; (4)
insufficient explanation for taking nonsuit; and (5) the filings of motions for summary
judgment.
Southard, supra note 109, at 371.
184

Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 387-88.

185
Head, supra note 1, at 27 (arguing that the plaintiff should at least be able to see the
defense before making the decision to continue); Solimine & Lippert, supra note 27, at 396
(describing this view as “too draconian”).
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VI. PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROACH 186
A. A Comprehensive Approach
The best approach for Ohio is a comprehensive approach to voluntary dismissal.
A balance has been struck by extracting the best ideas from the federal and state
rules. Shortening the time permitted for voluntary dismissal up to the answer or
summary judgment puts the length of time for the absolute right of voluntary
dismissal in the hands of the defendant. By being proactive, the defendant can
shorten that time period. In turn, this threat from the defendant forces the plaintiff to
evaluate and accomplish more work on his or her case to determine whether he or
she should dismiss earlier. Ohio should not adopt the New York standard that takes
away plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal without a court order after twenty days.
If a defendant is lazy and slow to answer, then the plaintiff should be given more
time to dismiss. The adoption of a rule similar to the Wisconsin Rule provides the
court with guidelines that include the interest of the court. It also removes the
harshness from the Federal Rule.
First, this modified Federal Rule balances the interests of all the parties. 187 The
modified Federal Rule anticipates situations where the plaintiff might need to
dismiss because of surprise or emergency. Plaintiffs would still be able to dismiss up
to the eve of trial permitting approval from the court. The trial court judge “is
perfectly capable of protecting the plaintiff in cases of hardship or surprise.” 188 This
allows the court more “flexibility in protecting rights and defending against
injustices.” 189 The Federal Rule, however, does not weigh the interest of the courts.
Taking the lead from Wisconsin, the rule should be modified to add this to the
discretion of the court.
Second, the proposed rule complements Ohio’s current civil procedure rules.
Ohio has adopted the Federal Rules in most areas. The rules are much more liberal
and flexible than previous systems. With the Ohio Rules’ liberal stance on pleadings
and continuances, it seems unnecessary for the plaintiff to have the absolute right to
voluntarily dismiss. 190 Along the same lines, it seems more appropriate considering
the changes in the way trials are managed. With increasingly complicated discovery

186
Any proposed action to change the rules of civil procedure in Ohio must be a judicial
action. “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state . . . .” OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B); see also Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611
N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993) (invalidating a statute that conflicted with an Ohio Rule of Civil
Procedure on the grounds that the Ohio Constitution gave power to make rules of procedure to
the Supreme Court of Ohio). For a great discussion on separation of powers in Ohio, see
Curtis Rodebush, Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Critical Analysis, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505
(2004).
187

Clinton H. McKay, Voluntary Dismissals and Non-Suits in Tennessee, 15 TENN. L.
REV. 787, 789 (1937-1939); see also Sweeney, supra note 88, at 766.
188

Lipkin, supra note 7, at 987.

189

Tucker, supra note 18, at 366.

190

See supra note 90.
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and judges engaging in more proactive case management, the modified Federal Rule
is advantageous. 191
Third, the modified Federal Rule offers flexibility. While the federal courts have
chosen a strict view on judicial discretion, other states like New York and Wisconsin
have broader discretion for the court. Conversely, Ohio should guide judicial
discretion and suggest factors that judges should consider when reviewing a motion
for voluntary dismissal. These factors should reflect the abuses that Ohio is
attempting to avoid. Not only the does the Federal Rule cut off the absolute right of
voluntary dismissal earlier, but Ohio can also format it to fit the special needs of
Ohio. Like New York and Wisconsin, Ohio should adopt the Federal Rule but give
more clarity to the discretion of the court. Limiting the court’s discretion may
appease the powerful plaintiff’s bar in Ohio. If voluntary dismissal is requested after
an answer has been filed, the judge may require terms and conditions. In this
instance, if the judge finds the reasons to be lacking, he or she may award the
defendant costs or attorney’s fees. 192
B. Sample Language
The Ohio Rule on voluntary dismissal should be amended to allow voluntary
dismissal by notice until “the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for
summary judgment.” This would effectively adopt the Federal Rule as to the time
when the plaintiff would lose his or her right to dismiss without an order of the court.
Furthermore, the Ohio Rule allowing dismissal by order of the court should be
amended to state: “The court shall consider the interests of all the parties including
the court’s interest in the efficient use of judicial resources.” This allows courts to
consider the efficient use of judicial resources as a factor in determining whether to
grant a motion for dismissal or not. Finally, the Ohio Rule should be further
amended to list factors that the court should consider. This list should not be
exhaustive but should include time, expense, and diligence of all the parties
involved.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of Ohio’s Rules of Civil Procedure is “to effect just results by
eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
administration of justice.” 193 Ohio’s Rule concerning voluntary dismissal fails to
meet these purposes. The law not only facilitates abuse; it encourages abuse through
factors like the savings statute. These abuses result in further delay and unnecessary
expenses to both the courts and the parties involved. Furthermore, the Ohio Rule
hinders the efficient administration of justice. “No clearer case of delay to the
judicial process, unnecessary expense to an opposing party, and encumbering of the
court’s docket exists than when a case is voluntarily dismissed by a party and then
refiled.” 194

191

Tucker, supra note 18, at 367.

192

Southard, supra note 109, at 371.

193

OHIO R. CIV. P. 1(B).

194

Hosner v. Gibson Partner, Inc., 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 4-5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986).
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The modified Federal Rule, however, restricts the opportunity for abuse while
limiting possible expenses to the parties and the judicial system. First, the proposed
rule balances the interests of all the parties. 195 Second, the proposed rule is
complementary to the procedural system that Ohio has adopted. 196 Third, the
proposed rule provides judicial discretion to prevent abuses but restricts discretion so
that it will not be overbearing. 197
The plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal is important, but it should be
restricted. Many valid reasons exist for plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss a cause of
action. 198 Under the modified Federal Rule, plaintiffs would still have that right up
to trial, as long as their reasons are valid. The judge may award costs to the
defendant, but that is not an overbearing limitation. The modified Federal Rule on
voluntary dismissal bars abuse of the rule without barring voluntary dismissal.

195

See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.

196

See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.

197

See supra Part VI.A.

198

See supra Part V.D.
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